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Patent Law:
Empirical Evidence of Drug Pricing Games—
A Citizen’s Pathway Gone Astray
Robin Feldman1
The advent of generic drugs in the United States has been one of the
most significant sources of cost savings in modern health care.
Specifically, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) estimates that
consumers saved $254 billion in 2014 through generic competition and
achieved a total of $1.68 trillion of savings in the decade between 2005
and 2014. The staggering cost reductions are the result of both
widespread availability of generic drugs and the deep discounts that
result in markets with generic competition. Over 80% of small-molecule
drugs have generic equivalents, and more than 80% of all prescriptions
are filled using generic medication. After generic competition begins, the
price of most drugs eventually falls to 80% to 85% below the original
brand-name cost.
Brand-name drug companies, who enjoy a monopoly in the market
for a drug until generic entry, face a nearly instant plummet in market
share and price. Considering that generic entry often coincides with the
expiration of a brand-name company’s patents or FDA exclusivities, it is
no surprise that looming generic competition is often referred to as the
“patent cliff.” It is also not surprising that patent holders try to prevent
falling into the approaching chasm using any means possible. With
settlements between brand-name companies and prospective generics
coming under this substantial scrutiny in recent years, pharmaceutical
companies have turned to new tactics to delay generic entry. These
strategies make use of public FDA petition processes, inconsequential
labeling changes, slight tweaks to existing drugs and formulations, and
1. Summarized and excerpted from Robin Feldman et al., Empirical Evidence of
Drug Pricing Games—A Citizen’s Pathway Gone Astray, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 39
(2017). For more information visit the website at https://law.stanford.edu/stanfordtechnology-law-review-stlr/. In accordance with the protocols outlined in the Harvard
Journal of Law & Technology Open Letter on Ethical Norms, all of the data is publicly
available for future use by other academics on SSRN.com. See Robin Feldman et al.,
Database from Empirical Evidence of Drug Pricing Games—A Citizen’s Pathway Gone
Astray, SSRN (Mar. 7, 2017) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2924
673 [http://perma.cc/B8S4-PEYH]. In further accord with the Open Letter, the University
of California Hastings Institute for Innovation Law, which Robin Feldman directs, has
made donation information available. See http://innovation.uchastings.edu/about/funding/
funding-for-academic-year-2015-2016 [http://perma.cc/EK2K-XB72]. No private or
corporate donor accounts for more than 10% of the Institute’s budget.
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disingenuous safety concerns, among others, to block generic
competition and obtain additional months of monopoly power. The move
has been from collaboration with generic-drug makers to obstruction of
them. Even if these tactics are likely to fail in constructing a permanent
generic blockade, they are relatively costless and easy to attempt; and
even if they only secure a few months of last-ditch delay, those precious
few months could still be worth hundreds of millions of dollars, given
that top-selling drugs may exceed $1 billion in U.S. sales annually. The
strategy is similar to futile measures to slow a sinking ship by tossing
everything overboard; the outcome is essentially inevitable, but the
timing is malleable. In this case, slowing submersion, even marginally,
can be extremely valuable.
With anecdotes as well as recent scholarship, concerns have swirled
around the citizen petition process at the FDA. The FDA’s citizen
petition process was created in the 1970s, along with similar programs at
other agencies, and was intended to fashion more participatory regimes,
in which ordinary citizens could access the administrative process. The
theoretical underpinnings hypothesized that a participatory structure
would prevent regulatory agencies from being captured by the very
industries they were designed to police. Recent evidence suggests,
however, that the FDA’s citizen petition process may have taken a
different turn. That issue is analyzed here.
The citizen petition process was mandated by Congress’s passage of
the Administrative Procedure Act, which requires federal agencies to
create a formal route for the public to petition an agency to change,
amend, or repeal an agency rule. As described above, the FDA’s citizen
petition process can be traced back to the 1970s, a period in which courts
and policy-makers encouraged the creation of pathways so that ordinary
citizens could engage in the administrative process taking place at
regulatory agencies. The FDA’s process allows petitioners to “request
the Commissioner of Food and Drugs to . . . (issue, amend, or revoke a
regulation or order or take or refrain from any other form of
administrative action).” Petitions must state all factual and legal grounds
for the petition, provide all relevant information (including that which
may be unfavorable), and add an environmental or economic impact
section if necessary. The agency must make a final grant or denial of the
petition.
On its face, the citizen petition process should be a useful method
for ensuring that the public can communicate its concerns to a key
regulatory agency. A mechanism designed for concerned citizens and
scientists to raise concerns about drugs, food, and FDA regulations,
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however, has seemingly turned into a playground for pharmaceutical
companies to challenge drug applications, especially those related to
pending generic applications. In many cases, the “concerned citizen”
behind a petition is actually a large pharmaceutical company, seeking to
stop or delay approval of a generic drug through a variety of different
arguments. These include direct attacks against the generic’s application
and its bioequivalence or clinical data, appeals to safety, calls to preserve
or add new exclusivities for the brand-name drug, and more. Some
petitions raise important or necessary issues; many others, however,
seem frivolous or questionable.
As an example of a troubling citizen petition, consider the petition
filed in 2007 by Mutual Pharmaceuticals, a company the FDA had
already approved to sell a generic version of the blood pressure medicine
felodipine. The petition sought to delay other generic companies from
gaining approval. Specifically, the petition requested that the FDA not
approve any new generic applications while it decided whether warnings
should be added to the current drug labels regarding whether products
containing certain forms of orange juice might affect absorption of the
drug. The petition further suggested that all new generic drug approvals
should be delayed until the FDA asked the original drug maker to specify
which form of orange juice was used in its studies. Of course, as a
currently approved seller of generic felodipine, the company writing the
citizen petition would be free to continue selling the existing labels based
on existing study information.
Mutual Pharmaceuticals explained that its citizen petition was
motivated by a study showing different effects of Seville orange juice
versus “regular” orange juice on metabolism. Seville oranges are a
smaller, more bitter orange often used for marmalade and liqueurs. The
FDA, however, was unimpressed. In its response to the petition, the
Agency stated, “we do not believe that the results of the Malhotra study
present a serious safety concern.” In fact, the FDA seemed to have a
clear disdain for the claims made in the petition:
[Y]ou hypothesize that there may be clinical consequences
associated with the coadminstration of felodipine and
components of Seville orange juice consumed in this form. You
have offered no data to support this hypothesis. In fact, we
searched the Adverse Event Reporting System (AERS) database
and found no reported interactions between Seville or bitter
orange products and any drug product.
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A footnote hinted at the FDA’s skepticism of Mutual’s motives for
filing the petition, questioning the truthfulness of Mutual’s affirmations:
“You have certified that you first became aware of the information upon
which you have based Petition 1 (i.e., the Malhotra study) on November
5, 2007. We note, however, the Malhotra study was published in 2001
and predates approval of Mutual’s [generic application].”
Unsurprisingly, Mutual was the first company to receive approval to
sell generic felodipine, receiving approval from the FDA in 2004. Mylan,
a competing generic-drug company, filed the next generic application in
the first quarter of 2007, just months before Mutual filed its citizen
petition. The FDA denied the citizen petition the following year, on April
17, 2008—the same day that Mylan’s generic application was approved.
The timing indicates that Mutual’s “orange juice petition” was one of the
last barriers to final approval. Thus, a last-minute, baseless petition about
types of orange juice cost consumers untold millions by delaying the
approval of a second generic for felodipine.
This example of felodipine fits the rumors swirling about the current
modus operandi for citizen petitions—pharmaceutical companies make a
facially interesting, scientific-sounding claim (for example, Seville
orange juice actually does increase absorption and peak drug
concentration) timed to the months right before generic application
approval, and the claims are eventually denied by the FDA. Despite the
eventual denial, the delays cost consumers untold sums and waste
governmental resources.
After years of hearings and debate on numerous FDA regulatory
issues, Congress passed the Food and Drug Administration Amendments
Act (FDAAA) in 2007. The Act included the largest reform of the citizen
petition process in the program’s thirty-year history. These changes
attempted to address concerns with citizen petitioning at the FDA,
ranging from growing petition backlogs to signs that the process was
being used inappropriately to delay entry of generic drugs. The
Amendments aimed to curb attempts to both block and delay the entry of
generics.
Specifically, the 2007 Amendments added subsection “(q)” to 21
U.S.C. § 355, where most of the legislation relating to generic
applications already resided. This new provision generally is called
“505(q)” in academic and regulatory discussions, and the petitions that
fall under it are called “505(q) petitions.”
Section 505(q) applies a new set of regulations to all citizen
petitions that ask the FDA to take action related to a pending generic
application. Most notably, the section requires that the FDA respond to
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all such petitions within 180 days. In 2012, this deadline was further
shortened to 150 days through the Food and Drug Administration Safety
and Innovation Act (FDASIA). Approval of a generic application cannot
be delayed because of a citizen petition beyond the 180-day (and later
150-day) review period, unless it is determined that a delay is necessary
for public-health reasons.
Most importantly, § 505(q) contains provisions intended to deter
those who would file citizen petitions to delay generic competition. If a
citizen petition relating to a generic application falls under § 505(q), the
person filing the petition must certify that the petition is not frivolous, all
information favorable and unfavorable has been provided, and the
petitioner did not intentionally delay filing the petition. The citizen
petition also must provide the date when the filer first became aware of
the concern and the names of those who are funding the petition.
Finally, § 505(q) grants the FDA the power to summarily deny any
petition it believes was filed with the “primary purpose” of delaying
generic approval if the petition also does not “on its face raise valid
scientific or regulatory issues.” Together, the provisions of § 505(q) were
meant to end the abuse of citizen petitions by pharmaceutical companies.
The major changes to the citizen petition process beginning in 2007
serve as a natural break point in the data, allowing observations of any
effects of the legislation along with trends across time. In addition, some
of the data reports mandated by the 2007 Amendments provide
interesting information for exploration.
As described above, anecdotes have swirled for years suggesting
that drug companies abuse the citizen petition process to keep generics
off the market. The goal of the quantitative look taken here was to
empirically explore whether pharmaceutical companies systematically
use the citizen petition process to delay entry of generic drugs.
Exploring that question, required an analysis of the timing of when
citizen petitions were filed during the generic drug approval process and
the frequency with which petitions that have the potential to delay were
filed. The hypothesis was that such petitions had been filed towards the
end of the approval process to put up one more roadblock in the path of
successful approval of a generic drug.
Assembling the necessary information from the FDA’s publicly
available files was tremendously difficult. Although the FDA publishes a
large amount of information on its public website, and more in hard copy
through its Orange Book, much important information is absent. The
necessary information often must be pieced together or estimated; in
some cases, it simply cannot be located. For example, the FDA does not
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always publicly reveal the dates when generic applications are filed.
Many of those dates were tracked down by reading PDFs of various
letters in the files of approved applications. For many others, however, a
method had to be developed for identifying the likely quarter in which an
application was filed by working from the FDA’s file numbering
systems. Despite these challenges, a data set was assembled of citizen
petitions that had the potential to delay generic applications, along with
the relevant generic application and timing data.
The following are the key findings from the study:








The FDA’s citizen petition pathway is one of the key
pathways involved in the modern generation of generic-drug
delay, playing a role in various game-playing strategies.
Citizen petitions from competitor companies—brand names
and generics seeking to delay competitors—have essentially
doubled since 2003.
Citizen petitions with the potential to delay generic entry
have constituted a striking portion of the citizen petitions in
recent years. Out of all citizen petitions filed at the FDA
between 2000 and 2012 (including those concerning
tobacco, food, dietary supplements, medical devices, etc.),
nearly 15% had the potential to delay a generic drug
application, climbing to 20% in some years.
Many citizen petitions appear to be a last-ditch effort to hold
off generic competition. In fact, the most common category
of all generic-related petitions was petitions filed within six
months of generic approval. This is particularly striking
given other research showing that the overwhelming
majority of citizen petitions are denied. In other words, the
results suggest that many competitor petitions are filed late
in the game as a final effort to hold off competition just a
little longer, even though they are unlikely to be successful.
Congressional reforms enacted in 2007 have not stemmed
the tide of such delay-related petitions.

With these empirical findings as a backdrop, three approaches to curb the
behavior are possible: (1) a simple prohibition, if one were to conclude
that most behavior in the category is likely to be inappropriate; (2)
procedural blocks to ensure that the behavior cannot create suboptimal
results; and (3) punitive measures as a deterrent. The data also suggest
the need for improvement in FDA data collection and transparency.

